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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. CASE NO: 20 12-CF -003160 
ANDREW MANISCALCO, 
Defendant. 
--------------------------------~/ 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's "Amended Motion to Dismiss," filed 
on May 3, 2013; and the hearing that was held on May 28, 2013. The Court has reviewed the 
motion, the evidence, the oral arguments, and the applicable law, and is otherwise duly advised 
in the premises. 
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The undisputed facts of this case, as presented at the hearing, are as follows'?;;OnCfu 
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around September 12, 2012, a law enforcement officer, posing as "Jess," placed an a~~raigj; 
--- c-, 02 
List, I with the subject of "Any good guys out there." The body of the ad stated "jts'i f.ecently 
moved to the area looking to meet and make some new friends. I fun to be around like to hang if 
interested chat me back. ,,2 In order to place such an ad, the officer had to verify being at least 
eighteen (18) years of age or older. 
In response to the ad, Defendant sent "Jess" an email saying, "Hello, I'm Andrew. I am 
from Tampa. I am 25, and would like to know more about you." Once "Jess" received 
I www.craigslist.org is a community-based website for local classified advertisements and community forums. 
2 To avoid redundancy and promote ease of reading, the Court will not "sic" all of the errors in the parties' 
communications. All matters in quotes are taken verbatim from the communications that were introduced at the 
hearing. 
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Defendant's email, she informed him that she was 14, and that she was trying to make new 
friends. Surprised, Defendant responded, "Are you really 14? You do realize I am 25 right? ... 
. " Upon receiving a picture of "Jess," and her assurance that she was really 14, Defendant stated, 
"You are actually really cute .... Too bad you aren't a little older." In a follow-up email, 
Defendant also stated, "You look older. I would say if you were 18 or 19. Would have like to 
meet you sometime." "Jess" responded by stating that she was "sorry if your not interested." At 
this point, the following conversation ensued: 
Defendant: "I am interested in talking to you. After all you are 
cute and you don't look your age. I was just saying its too bad we 
didn't meet in person. So you just looking to make friends and talk 
online?" 
"Jess": "r u looking for more" 
Defendant: "Not really. Could hang out if it was mutual, but I am 
fine with just have someone to talk to." 
Defendant: "I mean, if you are not than I am fine with emailing, or 
texting, or skipping or whatever. Talking and making friends is 
good. I mostly meet people around my age is all, but age is but a 
number for friends" 
"Jess": "Well i am single and ur right age is just a number 101" 
Following this conversation, Defendant and "Jess" discussed the possibility of meeting 
and talked about what they liked to do for fun. "Jess" then interjected, reminding Defendant that 
she was only 14. Defendant assured her that it was not a problem, stating, "I don't mind that you 
are 14 yo. I do want to chat and I do want to meet you, hang out and see if anything comes from 
it. If anything we will just end up friends. You are really pretty, and I don't care about the age. 
I hope you don't either." Defendant then provided "Jess" with his phone number, which she 
called, and the two had a brief conversation and arranged for Defendant to go to "Jess's house" 
to go swimming. 
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After the phone call, "Jess" and Defendant engaged in a text-message conversation; 
however, Defendant asked "Jess" to call him again, because he could not text and drive. During 
this second phone call, Defendant asks if there is anything "Jess" wants him to bring to the 
house, and "Jess" says that she's nervous about Defendant coming over. Defendant tells "Jess" 
more about his interests, assures her that he is "normal," and tells her that he just wants to swim 
and hang out. 
Thereafter, the parties continued to text one another, and "Jess" says "im not sure if im 
interested it seems like ur playing games may b were not on the same page." In response, 
Defendant swears that he's "not playing games" and again asks "Jess" what she wants to do. 
"Jess" says that she does not know, and she turns the question back to Defendant, starting the 
following conversation: 
"Jess": "idk that is what I was asking u what were u interested n 
doing" 
Defendant: "Spending time with you" 
Defendant: "Swimming and getting to know you and having fun" 
"Jess": "obviously ur look at more then jus swim 101" 
Defendant: "I just want to swim and hang out. Yes you are 
beautiful but I do not take advantage of people." 
"Jess": "who said u were takin advantage of anyone" 
"Jess": "it seem lik u wanted to hook up from ur email lik mor 
then friends" 
Defendant: "I want to get to know you more. Like talk with you 
in person." 
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Defendant: "Not looking for anything sexual." 
"Jess": "oh i thought you were interested n me more then friends" 
Defendant: "I don't want just a hook up. I want more like a 
relationship. What I meant was I want to enjoy your company, and 
if something happened then it happens. You are beautiful and I 
would be lucky to be in a relationship with u" 
Defendant: "I'm almost to Palmetto. Does that mean you don't 
want to swim or even see me?" 
"Jess": "what if something happened what r u prepared to do I 
need details 101" 
Defendant: "Like what? If we kissed or made out." 
Defendant: "What u mean prepared?" 
"Jess": "ya like if u kissed me and were alone what would u do i 
need details 101" 
Defendant: "Kiss you slowly and softly. After the first move is 
made, it's up to you if you want to move on." 
Defendant: "Do you want me to be sexual?" 
"Jess": "maybe 101" 
At this point, after three hours, several emails, multiple phone calls, and numerous text 
messages, Defendant finally started to send sexually explicit text messages to "Jess." As a result, 
Defendant was arrested upon his arrival at "Jess's house," and subsequently charged by 
Information with one count of Travel to Seduce/SolicitlEntice a Child to Commit a Sex Act, 
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 847.0135(4)(a). 
Legal Analysis 
In the present motion, Defendant moves for a dismissal of his charges on the grounds that 
he was entrapped by the government. An entrapment defense is meant to prevent a government 
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agent from "originat[ing] a criminal design, implant[ing] in an innocent person's mind the 
disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induc[ing] commission of the crime so that the 
government may prosecute." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,548 (1992). 
Florida law recognizes both a due process entrapment defense and a subjective 
entrapment defense. Cabrera v. State, 766 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The due 
process entrapment theory, which is often referred to as the objective theory of entrapment, 
"operates as a bar to prosecution in those instances where the government's conduct 'so offends 
decency or a sense of justice' that it amounts to a denial of due process." Davis v. State, 937 So. 
2d 300, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting State v. Blanco, 896 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2005); see also Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 98-99 (Fla. 1993). In the absence of egregious 
law enforcement conduct, a subjective entrapment analysis, as codified in Fla. Stat. § 777.201, is 
to be applied. Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. In the present case, the Court concludes that the 
government conduct was not so egregious as to constitute a due process violation. Therefore, the 
Court will focus solely on the defense of subjective entrapment. 
The subjective entrapment analysis focuses on three issues. First, the defendant must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement officer, a person engaged in 
cooperation with a law enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement 
officer induced the defendant to commit the offense charged. Fla. Stat. § 777.201; and Munoz, 
629 So. 2d at 99. Second, the defendant must prove that he or she was not predisposed to 
commit the offense. !d. Once the defendant has satisfied this initial burden, the prosecution has 
the burden to rebut the defendant's evidence and prove predisposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. Third, the court must decide "whether the entrapment evaluation should be submitted 
5 
Monday, June 10, 2013 PCLELAND 
to a jury" because factual issues are in dispute or because reasonable persons could draw 
different conclusions from the facts. Id. at 100. 
A. Inducement Analysis 
Inducement is "[a]ny government act creating substantial risk that an otherwise law-
abiding citizen would commit an offense, including persuasion, fraudulent misrepresentations, 
threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or 
friendship." Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Davis, 36 F. 3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, "[a]n 'inducement' consists of an 
'opportunity' plus something else-typically excessive pressure by the government upon the 
defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive." 
United States v. Gendron, 18 F. 3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, "the government may not play on 
the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguile him into committing crimes which he otherwise 
would not have attempted." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992). 
In the present case, the State argued repeatedly at the hearing that Defendant was not 
induced because "law enforcement was never the one to bring up anything sexual." This Court 
disagrees. When pushed by "Jess" about what he wanted to do and what he wanted from "Jess," 
Defendant repeatedly stated that he just wanted to swim and "hang out" and that he was not 
looking for anything sexual. Specifically, Defendant stated, "I just want to swim and hang out. 
Yes you are beautiful but I do not take advantage of people." Where upon, "Jess" inserted a 
sexually charged comment, asking, "who said u were takin advantage of anyone?" "Jess" 
followed this comment with "it seem lik u wanted to hook up from ur email lik mor then 
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friends." Thus, it was "Jess," not Defendant, who first sent the conversation III a sexual 
direction. 
Nevertheless, even upon this prodding from "Jess," Defendant still stated that he was not 
looking for anything sexual and that he just wanted to get to know her better. However, "Jess" 
was undeterred; she continued to push Defendant by saying "what if something happened what r 
u prepared to do I need details 101." Confused, Defendant asked, "Like what? If we kissed or 
made out ... What u mean prepared?" "Jess" responded in the affirmative and once again asked 
for more details about what Defendant would do "if u kissed me and [we] were alone." 
Therefore, it is clear from the record that on two occasions, the State actively attempted to steer 
Defendant into engaging in a sexual discussion. 
For this reason, the present case is clearly distinguishable from Mareel v. State, 841 So. 
2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the 
defendant had not been entrapped. In Mareel, a special agent entered a chatroom entitled 
"Married Wants Affair" and posed as a fifteen-year-old girl named Kelly. The defendant entered 
the same chatroom and engaged "Kelly" in conversation. When the defendant asked "Kelly" if 
she was married, "Kelly" told the defendant that she was only 15. Upon learning that "Kelly" 
was a minor, the defendant asked her for a picture, asked if she was looking for "older guys," 
and asked if she was "looking for just a sexual relationship." When "Kelly" responded that she 
was "maybe" looking for something sexual, the two discussed the possibility of meeting and the 
sexual "touching" that would occur if they met. Throughout the next several weeks, the 
defendant and "Kelly" engaged in many emails, online chats, and telephone calls. Eventually, 
they arranged to meet at a local McDonalds, and the defendant was arrested. 
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In a pre-trial motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that he had been entrapped. The 
trial court disagreed. Significantly, the court noted that "Kelly" had immediately identified 
herself as a minor; yet, the defendant was undeterred and asked her if she was interested in a 
sexual relationship within the first 14 minutes of talking to her. On appeal, the Fourth District 
Court agreed, stating that "'Kelly' merely created an opportunity for appellant to attempt to lure 
or entice a minor to participate in sexual activities. There were no coercive tactics or 'arm-
twisting' on the part of law enforcement; [the defendant] was already on the 'iniquitous path. '" 
Id. at 603. 
Here, it is clear that Defendant was not already on the "iniquitous path"; the State had to 
lead him there. Upon learning that "Jess" was only 14, Defendant immediately stated that he 
was just interested in talking and that he hoped that they could be friends. Moreover, Defendant 
repeatedly indicated that he was not looking for anything sexual and that he just wanted to meet 
and "hang out." When the conversation did finally tum sexual, it was "Jess," not Defendant, 
who initiated this discussion. Therefore, this Court concludes that the present case is clearly 
distinguishable from Mareel. 
On the other hand, the Court concludes that the conduct of the government in this case is 
comparable to that in Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In Farley, the 
Broward County Sheriff's Office was alerted that the defendant's name was found on a list 
uncovered in a child pornography investigation in Texas. As a result, the Sheriff's Office sent 
the defendant a spam email inviting those looking for "hard to find" sexual materials to visit a 
fictitious company website. The email also contained assurances that any communication with 
the company would be protected from government interference. Upon receiving the email, the 
defendant visited the website and input a request for specific pictures of teenage boys. In 
8 
-------------------..M.-on-d.-ay-,---Ju-ne----.-1 OC-C, 2=O~13"'P=C"'L=E"LA .. N=-D ---- -- ---- ----- - ------ ------------
response, a detective sent the defendant an email requesting more specific details regarding the 
defendant's preferences. After an exchange of emails in which the detective sought, and the 
defendant provided, more and more specific details, the detective provided the defendant with an 
order form and the defendant placed his order. Thereafter, the two arranged to meet for the 
delivery of the videos, and the defendant was subsequently arrested. 
The defendant raised the defense of entrapment, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
concluded that he had been entrapped as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
found that the conduct of the government had progressed from "innocent lure" to "frank offer," 
as required for inducement. Specifically, the Court noted that "[ w]hat began as a plan to 
possibly uncover an offender from the Texas list, became a concerted effort to lure Farley into 
committing a crime." ld. at 396. 
Just as in Farley, the Defendant in this case was targeted arbitrarily, without any evidence 
that he was already engaged in criminal activity. Thereafter, the government made a concerted 
effort to lure him into committing a crime. Like in Farley, the parties in this case engaged in an 
exchange of correspondence that consisted of the government seeking more and more detailed 
information. Here, "Jess" repeatedly asked Defendant for details, stating, "what if something 
happened what r u prepared to do I need details 101," and "ya like if u kissed me and were alone 
what would u do i need details 101." Accordingly, the exchange of text messages in this case was 
similar to the emails in Farley. More importantly, in this case, unlike the defendant in Farley, 
Defendant did not respond to the advertisement by immediately seeking an encounter with a 
minor. Instead, Defendant sought only to meet a girl of unknown age looking for a "good guy." 
When he learned that this girl was 14, his immediate response was that they could talk and be 
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friends. Therefore, the Defendant here required much more inducement than the defendant in 
Farley. 
Accordingly, upon extensive review of the case law as applied to the instant facts, the 
Court concludes that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that he was induced to 
commit the crime of which he is now charged. 
B. Predisposition Analysis 
Having concluded that Defendant was induced to commit the present crimes, the Court 
must now turn to the issue of predisposition. Predisposition turns on "whether the accused was 
awaiting any propitious opportunity or was ready and willing, without persuasion, to commit the 
offense." Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. "Predisposition is ... not present when [a defendant] has no 
prior criminal history related to the offense at issue." Farley, 848 So. 2d at 396. A defendant 
has also been found not to be predisposed where the defendant was not targeted by law 
enforcement and "was not known for deviant behavior" prior to the incident at issue. Id. 
"Evidence of predisposition is limited to the extent it demonstrates predisposition on the part of 
the accused both prior to and independent of the government acts. Further, care must be taken in 
establishing the predisposition of a defendant based on conduct that results from the 
inducement." Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. 
In the present case, Defendant has demonstrated that he was not under investigation by 
law enforcement prior to committing this crime. Moreover, Defendant has no criminal history, 
let alone criminal history related to the instant offense. Accordingly, the facts of this case, with 
respect to Defendant's predisposition, are similar to those in Farley, 848 So. 2d at396, in which 
the court found it significant that the defendant had never been arrested for anything in his life, 
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let alone for the offense for which he was currently charged. The court also noted that the 
defendant had not been "involved in an existing criminal undertaking in need of detection by law 
enforcement; rather, [the government] sought to manufacture crime based on a list of names and 
addresses of unknown origin." Id. at 397. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant here has satisfied his burden of proving that 
he was not predisposed to commit the offenses at issue. See Farley, supra. Thus, the burden 
shifts to the prosecution to rebut this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 
99. 
"In rebutting the defendant's lack of predisposition, the prosecution may make 'an 
appropriate and searching inquiry' into the conduct of the accused and present evidence of the 
accused's prior criminal history." !d. Here, the only evidence presented by the State to support a 
finding of predisposition is the exchange of emails. Although the "ready commission of the 
criminal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition,,,3 those are not the facts of this 
case. The Defendant in this case repeatedly stated that he was not interested in anything sexual, 
and he had to be pressured repeatedly by the government before he engaged in any sexual 
chatter. Therefore, the Court concludes that this conduct does not constitute the "ready 
commission of the criminal act." As such, when the only evidence of predisposition is not 
independent but rather is a product of the government's inducement to commit the offense, the 
state's burden has not been met. See Jacobson v. Us., 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992). Therefore, the 
Court concludes that the State has failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant was predisposed to commit this crime. See Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. 
3 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (\ 992). 
11 
.Monday, Ju-ne-10~O-1-3 -pcL-ELA.-cN=Dc--------------------------. 
C. Analysis of Submission to a Jury 
Finally, "[t]he third question under the subjective test is whether the entrapment 
evaluation should be submitted to a jury." Id. at 100. Fla. Stat. § 777.201 provides that the issue 
of entrapment shall be submitted to the trier of fact; "[h]owever, when the factual issues ... are 
not in dispute, 'then the trial judge has the authority to rule on the issue of predisposition as a 
matter of law.'" State v. Ramos, 632 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Munoz, 629 
So. 2d at 100). In the present case, the issues of fact are not in dispute. Therefore, upon diligent 
consideration, the Court finds that the Defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, it is hereby, 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss IS 
GRANTED. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida, this 
.6!!:- day of June 2013. 
John F. Lakin, Circuit Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing order was furnished by U.S. mail to Michael S. 
Perry, Esq., 49 East Ave. North, Sarasota, FL 34237; and by electronic mail to the Office of the 
State Attorney, attn: Garrett Franzen on this Jot.A day of June 2013. 
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